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Abstract 
Studies have been conducted about the role of foreign trade-driven technology transfer in the achievement of the 
Chinese miracle; however, when focusing on the opposite direction, the literature is not uniform: how are Western 
businesses affected by trade dealings which China? To what extent does this impact apply to the innovation cycle? 
In this research we focused on the linear correlation between innovation in European countries (proxied by patent 
applications) and imports from China, over the 15-year time period following China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001. Patent applications are used as a measure of innovation, integrated in an economic model 
inspired by the "Trapped Factors" model, that makes it possible to account for escape-competition effects. The 
model analyzes the 2002-2016 period across 22 European countries. Apart from evaluating the impact of Chinese 
imports on European innovation, our study provides a review of the major contributions that have characterized 
this research area in the most recent years, trying to categorize and to present them from a proactive and 
comprehensive point of view.      
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1. Introduction 
The economic side of the 21st century has so far been characterized by China’s rise as a one of the world’s most 
influential players, with its unprecedented growth altering and reshaping many traditional flows of global trade. 
Part of this dramatic transformation is due to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
which caused import tariffs to be significantly lowered. This fostered a dramatic increase in trade exchanges 
between other members of the WTO and China, which could eventually take advantage of its huge market and 
production potential. 
The evolving scenario has once again exposed the controversial correlation between trade shocks, welfare, 
and innovation, encouraging several studies to be carried out in order to explore this relationship under the new 
light shed by the rise of China. Some of these studies are forming part of the large family of researches that address 
the impact of lowered trade tariffs between low-wage countries and high-wage countries, especially when China 
is considered as proper example of low-wage country, among others: Chinese imports into Europe (Bloom, Draca, 
& Van Reenen, 2011), Chinese imports into United States (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2016), Chinese imports into 
Canada (Kueng, Li, & Yang, 2016), Chinese imports into South Korea (Ahn, Han, & Huang, 2018), French exports 
into China (Aghion, Bergeaud, Lequien, & Melitz, 2018).  Though reporting contrasting results, mostly due to 
geographical differences, the leading studies on this subject fundamentally agree about the distribution of affected 
businesses, as deeper effects are observed in those industries that are more exposed to the increased trade 
competition. Technological progress and production factor mobility are also playing a role according to certain 
studies, insofar as “trapped factors” are proved to act as magnifiers of the above-mentioned trade shock effects. 
By taking into account the different results of earlier studies, it is still necessary to hold ambivalent opinions 
about the impact of trade shocks between low-wage countries and high-wage countries, especially when China is 
involved. Beside the demonstrated benefits, there are also costs that need to be considered, such as distributional 
costs and adjustment costs. Different situations involve a different understating of trade benefits and costs, and the 
evaluation of such consequences has lately become a topic of major concern in many economic and business 
circles. 
Innovation is said to be possibly affected by a trade shock, which is a synonym for increased competition in 
terms of imports or exports. This study focuses primarily on the impact of import volume changes, which effect 
varies greatly between high-wage countries and low-wage countries, and across countries that feature different 
mobility levels in terms of production factors. In some cases, import competition is proved to affect innovation 
negatively, with technological change resulting in less gains for the innovating firm. In the majority of cases, a 
trade shock of this kind is positively related to innovation activities, especially when the imports originate from a 
low-wage country. The incoming flow of cheaper goods stimulates firms in high-wage countries to find another 
way of making profits, and oftentimes this leads to innovation activities. “Escape-competition effect” is a possible 
way to classify this trend (Aghion et al., 2014).  
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1.1 The role of China 
China’s rise is beyond doubt a fundamental feature of the early part of the 21st century, channelled through a 
process that started much earlier thanks to the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping and the trade boom ignited by 
the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. During the years, China’s economic approach 
gradually abandoned central planning and switched to market orientation, allowing more freedom for private 
players to operate and stimulating an exponential and unprecedented growth. Deng Xiaoping’s idea of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ), where foreign direct investment could be attracted proved successful, so much so that the 
total number of SEZs grew tenfold in only twenty years’ time. China’s ability of exporting manufacturing escalated 
quickly, accounting for a fifth of the global share in the mid-2010s and rightfully earning the title of “World’s 
Factory”. 
China is recently experiencing a slowdown in GDP growth and trade, which is thought to affect negatively 
the whole global economy, given China’s involvement in economic and political contexts all over the world. While 
China imports a significant amount of manufacturing goods (2 trillion dollars in early 2019), most of it is 
commodities and components for re-export, and only a fraction of it can be considered as manufactures for 
domestic use; for this reason, a shock to China’s economy has still the potential to be classified as an economic 
catastrophe in global terms. China is undeniably a giant which slowdown is a major cause of concern for several 
external players, Europe above all (EU countries combined hold the largest share of exports to China). Not to 
mention the shock wave generated by changes in the driving force of Chinese economy, namely its export 
dominance. 
China’s manufacturing supremacy can be partly explained by its huge supply of labor force, the comparatively 
high education of average workers, and the unparalleled urbanization process which saw many workers migrating 
into the industrial ecosystem. Nevertheless, China’s emergence as the backbone of global manufacturing cannot 
be solely explained by the size of its inputs. Most of the foreign direct investment flowing into China is actualized 
in the form of joint ventures, which are often responsible for a largest induction of technology spillover into 
domestic firms. Van Reenen and Yueh (2012) found that international joint ventures in China are synonymous 
with higher productivity, and that this is all the more true when an explicit technology transfer agreement is 
included in the venture. The government’s policy of encouraging the emergence of international joint ventures 
then somehow facilitated China’s pursuit of catching up with developed countries. 
The rise of China has transformed the economic scenario, redefining many beliefs and patterns which 
characterized the previous perception of trade practices. Huge trade shocks, such as that caused by China, are now 
perceived to imply significant adjustment costs that could conceivably overtake gains from trade. Autor (2016) is 
also challenging the earlier understanding that, as in the case of United States, consequential benefits are not 
necessarily featured in the redistributive nature of trade. 
 
1.2 Historical framework of China-Europe commercial relations 
When we look at the relationship between China and Europe, we see China is somehow increasingly permeating 
every aspect of the European economy, through a process that resembles the post-World War II scenario set up by 
the United States and spread all across its allies. In fact, it can be stated that China is now filling a void left by the 
United States in the Old Continent: many European countries never really managed to recover from the recession 
generated by the global financial crisis in 2008, and their compulsive need for foreign investments is now met by 
the expanding oversea ambitions of fast-growing China. After World War II, the US enacted the Marshall Plan, a 
set of investments which were intended to help the reconstruction of war-torn Europe and which had the additional 
effect of fostering international integration between Western European countries. This, of course, contributed to 
bring Europe under the sphere of influence of the United States. Today, with the American dominance slowly 
declining and hindered by protectionism, China’s foreign investments are percolating throughout Europe, in a 
trend that started in the last decade and is now burgeoning in the epochal investment project named “Belt and Road 
Initiative”. Chinese FDI is primarily targeting those countries and companies which have been mutilated the most 
by the 2008 global financial crisis and the economic stagnation that followed. Such investment activities are mostly 
taking the form of mergers and acquisitions (where economic crisis breeds chronic privatization), and green field 
investments (mostly in infrastructure), with their magnitude untouched by the global financial crisis (while global 
FDI dropped 40% on average, Chinese FDI increased sharply during the years 2007 to 2010). Indeed, the sudden 
wave of investment is a godsend for European business, which, should the opportunity arise, is not in a position 
to reject any potential aid; besides, it is conceivably positive for Europe when a foreign country invests there and 
fuels the European job market, instead of when European companies outsource their production abroad, benefitting 
foreign workers and economies. In contrast with the rapidly deteriorating US-China relationship (most recent 
issues concerning the legal activity of certain Chinese companies have contributed to the perception of United 
States as a hostile investing environment), the Europe-China relationship seems to be rather stable at the moment, 
and foreign investments into European countries have been conducted so far with relative ease. 
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1.2.1 Shared benefits of commercial relations 
A major by-product of this new state of affairs is, indeed, the ever-increasing trade dealings between the two 
regions. Diplomatic and institutional relationships paved the way for a smoother trade environment where 
Europe’s strong import capacity could finally be used by China to channel its enormous excessive production. 
Several European countries have also enjoyed their new partnership with China, especially as the burgeoning 
Chinese middle-class’s appetite for high-end products keeps on growing day after day. For instance, the total value 
of goods traded between China and the European Union was €4 billion in 1978; forty years later, in 2018, that 
number skyrocketed to €605 billion (Eurostat estimates). Still, it should not be ignored the fact that EU’s total 
exports to China grew much slower compared with EU’s total imports from China, meaning that EU’s trade deficit 
with China is constantly rising and could become a factor of major concern. 
In general, Europe took advantage of the low labor cost, while China obtained valuable shares of capital and 
technology spillovers. Chinese investments were also instrumental in sustaining a stagnating economy in many 
European countries, which in return allowed such countries to engage China on an equal footing concerning 
commercial and social issues as well. Besides, the relationship is expected to strengthen in the future, given the 
fact that China is increasingly interested in the service sector and opening up in terms of welcoming foreign 
businesses in the local market. The Belt and Road Initiative is also contributing in cementing the partnership, as 
more and more countries accept China’s role as a trustworthy partner and commit to the investment plan (Italy 
was the first member of the Group of Seven advanced economies in the world to formally join the Belt and Road 
initiative in March 2019). As in the case of United States’ Marshall Plan, BRI implies secondary aims for China 
which digress into the sphere of finance and geopolitics. The Initiative is supported by several large institutions, 
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and several other Chinese investment banks, as well as 
by many agencies of the Chinese government and other cooperation platforms, such as the Asia Europe Meeting 
(ASEM), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC). 
1.2.2 Potential points of conflict 
While enjoying undeniable benefits from the expanding relationship, it is not all a bed of roses for European 
countries: the legal certainty and security of investments is not yet proven, and the relative legislation is rather 
vague and often not implemented (the tracking of investment operations is also troublesome, as much of the 
Chinese outward investment is “filtered” through Hong Kong and other tax heavens); several antidumping 
measures have been undertaken in Europe concerning Chinese imports, as well as import tariffs which are deemed 
necessary to safeguard the local market from an unbearable shock; on the European Union side, it is argued that 
further integration with China might accelerate the decay process of European identity, with each single country 
trying to get the best commercial deal with China, at the expense of other member countries (for instance, Italy’s 
2019 accession to the Belt and Road Initiative was highly criticized by Germany and France, which for their part 
are already engaging in trade deals with China on a scale that is much larger than that of Italy). Last but not least, 
an unequivocal opening to China could be perceived by the United States as an act of treason from its oldest ally, 
at this moment in history when the American global dominance is being seriously challenged and the need for 
alliance is stronger than ever. 
 
1.3 Significance of the study 
When looking at the social and economic dynamics of the last two decades, the significance of this study speaks 
for itself. It can serve as a practical benchmark for managers and policymakers who deal with China and are 
concerned by the innovation capacity of the business entity they depend from. Trade with China is an essential 
feature of business activities for 21st century European business, in a moment in time when their need for a 
supportive commercial partner has become indispensable; at the same time, Chinese imports into Europe are also 
responsible for an important resurgence of competition in several stagnant sectors of European economy; the topic 
of innovation is once again at the very top of the priority list when it comes to European businesses and 
policymakers, and this study can be valuable in describing the existing relationship between innovation and trade 
with China and its medium-long period implications. 
Although this might look like a serviceable study to private businesses mostly, it is indeed an interesting 
benchmark for government officials as well: lately the public opinion has been particularly sensible to the topic of 
counter-liberalization and adoption of trade barriers, thanks mostly to the recent policies of United States and 
China (a commercial quarrel that has been named “Trade War” for the magnitude of the tariffs imposed), and 
many entities involved are actually wondering about the real economic effect behind such political moves. 
The hope is that this study will join the larger body of knowledge and records that already provide a valuable 
reference for researchers and analysts concerning the impact of Chinese trade and its consequences on the 
innovation activities of Western countries. Whether such consequences are positive or negative is currently an 
issue of major concern. 
Compared to other studies on the subject, a major contribution of this work is the broader set of countries, 
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and the longer timeframe. In general, earlier studies tended to focus on a decade-long timeframe encompassing 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001; our research, on the other hand, analyzes a 15-year 
time period subsequent to China’s accession, meaning from 2002 to 2016. This temporal location allows us to 
focus only on the effect of trade relations once they have been already liberated by China’s entering of the WTO. 
 
1.4 Purpose of the study 
In the context we delineated above, the estimation of Chinese imports affecting innovation activities in Europe 
shows, theoretically and statistically, that such correlation can actually be positive and of significant magnitude. 
Specifically, this study aims to: prove how volume changes in imports from China affect innovation processes in 
Europe, especially concerning the application of new patents; further explore the impact of China’s accession to 
the WTO on global economy in terms that are not strictly related to economic performance or geopolitical 
assertiveness; add evidence to the existing literature concerning the socioeconomic effects on Western countries 
stemming from trade liberalization with low-wage countries. 
 
2. Literature review 
We are aware of the publication of several studies concerning the role of trade exchanges (mostly imports) on the 
innovation capability of the recipient country, and we are also aware of the connections between those studies and 
the theoretical hierarchy existing among them. Although the results presented are sometimes conflicting, we can 
confidently say that the majority of the literature on the subject finds a positive correlation between trade shocks 
and innovation activities. When considering imports from a high-wage country into another high-wage country, 
the outcomes are mixed and it is not easy to define a clear resulting trend. 
Our analysis is inspired by the Trapped Factors model of innovation, and it therefore focuses on imports from a 
low-wage country (China) and their supposedly positive innovation-spurring effect on high-wage countries 
(European countries), but it sought to go beyond the effects of the trade shock itself, following up into the 
consequences of a long-term impact. 
 
2.1 Trapped Factors model and trade shocks in high-income countries 
Bloom (2011) examined the impact of trade on technical change in high-income countries as a consequence of a 
trade shock driven by a staggering increase in imports from a low-wage country; specifically, China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization in 2001 provided a solid case study for addressing this cause-effect correlation. 
It is found that the technical change observed within firms in 12 European countries is positively related to the 
increase in Chinese imports in the 1996-2005 period. The analysis was carried out at firm level through a sample 
of half a million firms. Both within firm margin (technological upgrading) and between firm margin (upgrading 
through selection) were observed. When looking at patent applications, IT intensity, R&D expenditure, and Total 
factor productivity as indicators of technology, evidence shows that all of them responded positively to the trade 
shock; the effect is larger for firms who were more exposed to Chinese import growth. The assessment of between 
firm impact showed opposite results, with imports from China that were negatively affecting both employment 
growth and survival; firms with a low patent stock (and therefore more exposed to Chinese imports) had a higher 
chance of exiting the market rather than high-tech firms. A major underlying principle here is that of ‘trapped 
factors’, which implies that workers have some firm-specific human capital and capital has firm-specific 
adjustment costs. 
Bloom, Romer, Terry, & Van Reenen (2010) set up the Trapped Factors model of innovation in order to 
provide a suitable framework for future observations. In such model, the factors of production are confined to the 
production of old goods. This is mostly due to sunk investments, and to a process that presupposes workers acquire 
a particular human capital that is specific to a certain firm only. Because of these assumptions, trade liberalization 
with low-wage countries results to be beneficial for high-wage countries: in fact, imports from low-wage countries 
will cause a fall in the profitability of old goods, as well as in the opportunity cost of innovating. Being “trapped”, 
the factor of production will be forced to innovate in order to escape the new competition arising from the low-
cost imports. It is important to note that, when the import shock comes from another high-wage country, there is 
no change in the market price of goods, and therefore no positive relationship with innovation as high-skilled 
workers will continue to produce the same goods. 
Bloom (2011) narrows down the focus of the Trapped Factors model to the peculiar case of Europe and China, 
applying such theory to the decade encompassing China’s accession to the WTO and the consequent trade 
liberalization and import shock. As it is suggested in the model, firms with trapped factors wouldn’t innovate 
unless exposed to a huge trade shock like the rise of China; by all means, the effect of import competition on 
innovation is greater for firms with a higher past total factor productivity. In its inherent features, China is not 
quantitatively different from other low wage countries, unless for the size of the trade shock. In terms of magnitude, 
it is assessed that over the 2000-2007 period Chinese imports accounted for a 14.7% increase in aggregate 
patenting per worker, a 14.1% increase in IT intensity, and a 11.8% increase in total factor productivity in European 
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manufacturing businesses. 
In addition, Bloom et al. (2018) further explored this case study by using the Trapped Factors framework at 
the micro level within a quantitative equilibrium model of product-cycle trade and growth. In estimating welfare 
gains from trade, it is accepted that some optimistic results must be necessarily balanced by the increase in 
inequality caused by trade liberalization. In the two decades bracketing China’s accession to the WTO (1994-
2014), the surge in Chinese import competition causes the same OECD high-wage firms to experience both a 
considerable increase in innovation and a significant employment loss at the same time. There is a notable 
difference with the earlier research by Bloom (2011), where the positive effect was strictly related to high-tech 
firms, and the negative effect to low-tech firms. Again, the cause-effect correlation is driven by a reduction in the 
opportunity cost of R&D, which is derived by a fall in the shadow cost of trapped factors. 
 
2.2 Trade-related innovation and technology transfer 
This framework belongs to a larger family of earlier studies which tried to rationalize the social and economic 
consequences that might be associated with international trade. Acharya & Keller (2007) explained total factor 
productivity differences among countries in terms of domestic technical change and international technology 
transfer. The main input for technical change was R&D expenditure, which in the thesis was also affected by 
foreign R&D; international market transactions are proved to be a likely conduit for technology spillover, as it is 
shown that the majority of technology transfer from the United States and the United Kingdom occurs through 
imports. The analysis showed that R&D has a significant effect on productivity, and that international technology 
transfer has even a bigger impact. It was also demonstrated that the global patterns of technology transfer are 
highly asymmetric, and that some countries benefit more than others because of a different absorptive capacity. 
The study was instrumental in isolating those high-technology sectors that were the drivers of productivity trends 
during the late 1980s and 1990s, but it addresses a different kind of innovation benefits, deriving from international 
transaction with developed countries. Bloom et al. (2018), instead, moved away from this approach and focus on 
a “necessary” innovation activity due to the increasing import competition from low-wage countries. The 
opportunity cost of innovation is reduced due to the factors of production being “trapped” in specific firms or 
industries, a condition which would result in lower returns from such factors as a consequence of their exposure 
to import competition. 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) explain the role of the market size effect in the reallocation consequences of 
trade liberalization, with a bilateral trade shock causing low-productivity firms to exit the market and high-
productivity firms to further expand their market share. Market size and trade are directly responsible for a 
strengthening of competition, which in turn conditions the underlying process of firm selection. A larger market 
is associated with a stronger competition, which is symptomatic of lower mark-ups – after trade liberalization, the 
number of firms in each market increases significantly – and higher productivity. Impullitti and Licandro (2010) 
implement such results by showing how trade-driven competition shocks exert their influence on both firm 
selection and innovation activities. Firm selection processes allow high-productivity firms to enjoy a larger share 
resources which can then be channelled into more innovation activities. Because of the enlarged market created 
by trade liberalization, innovation activities are stimulated for the very reason that innovation itself is cost-reducing. 
Although significant, this competition-induced effect accounts for a small share of the observed trade-induced 
growth, the majority of which is ascribed to the process of firm selection. 
Coelli, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018) expands the significance of market size by confirming its effect in 
the domain of innovation. During the period named Great Liberalization (across the 1990s, when import tariffs 
were reduced from 6 to 3 percent in developed countries, and from 20 to 13 percent in developing countries), a 
freer market access was significantly positively correlated with innovation. During those years, a 1 percent 
decrease in weighted average tariffs was associated with a 2 percent increase in innovation (measured in terms of 
patent applications). In addition, improved market access does not imply a decrease in the quality of innovation: 
when using patent applications as a proxy for innovation, it can be inferred that a freer market requires a higher 
degree of intellectual property right protection, which consequently spurs patent applications in the form of mere 
safe backstops. This is not the case, as the number of average citations is not falling, as well as the economic value 
of each single patent; hence, the quality of the patents – and therefore of innovation – is unaffected, legitimizing 
the usage of patents as a proxy for innovation. 
Though Bloom et al. (2011) showed mostly positive results related to Chinese-driven trade shocks in Western 
countries, subsequent studies found different results depending on the time frame or the socio-economic nature of 
importing countries. The results are evaluated according to several variables such as innovation, productivity, 
growth, wealth, and others. 
Kueng et al. (2017) report conflicting results for Canadian firms exposed to Chinese import competition. 
Firstly, innovation activities are reduced for manufacturing firms, mostly because of a decline in process 
innovation rather than in product innovation. In fact, separate sets of surveys from 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005, 
show that “firms that initially pursue process innovation strategies exhibit higher profits if they survive, but they 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.12, 2020 
 
26 
are more likely to exit in response to Chinese competition. In contrast, firms that initially pursue product innovation 
strategies perform better, conditional on survival, with no notable change in exit probability” (Kueng, 2017). 
Ahn et al. (2018) provide further support to the “escape-competition effect” by indicating that an increased 
trade exchange with China in both import and exports stimulated innovation among South Korean manufacturing 
firms. In the years 1996-2015, the positive correlation is mainly evident for large corporations rather than smaller 
firms, and only in sectors where there is initial technological supremacy by South Korea with regards to China. 
Aghion et al. (2018) address the issue from the opposite direction, investigating the impact on innovation of 
export shocks. A positive export shock increases market size and therefore provides innovation incentives, 
especially for high-productivity firms. There is also evidence of an induced competition effect, which affects 
negatively low-productivity firms in terms of profit and innovation. In spite of the low/high-productivity 
diversification, this effect is applicable to all domestic firms; the market-size effect, on the other hand, is only 
relevant for exporting firms, and has it that only firms that have a solid production base combined with a low 
marginal cost would be able to enjoy the export market upgrading. In conclusion, the impact of an export shock in 
terms of innovation is magnified positively for high-productivity firms, and negatively for low-productivity firms. 
Shu et al. (2018) confirm the hypothesis that the impact of import competition tends to be more positive for 
firms with a higher initial productivity. The analysis reviews two types of outcome in measuring innovation, in 
relation to productivity and trade liberalization: direct measures, such as R&D expenditure, patent applications, 
product mix, and adoption of new technologies; indirect measures, especially labor productivity and residual total 
factor productivity. The literature supports positive reactions to import competition shocks from the European 
business world and that of emerging economies, while the response is fairly negative for United States and Canada, 
where corporate R&D expenditure and process innovations are both reduced. If we abide by the guidelines set out 
in Bloom (2010), the reasons for this trend could be explained by factors of production being most likely “trapped” 
at firms in developing countries – and Europe – rather than in North America. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005) 
emphasized this hypothesis in a non-trapped factor model, in which similar results regarding the United States’ 
exposure to trade shocks are highlighted in the years 1977-97: following the “value share” approach outlined in 
Bernard et al., 2004), increasing imports from low-wage countries was negatively correlated with firm survival 
and growth; import shocks had also an impact in terms of reallocation in manufacturing establishments which is 
consistent with the results obtained by Bloom (2011) concerning Chinese imports into Europe, insofar as the 
production activity is mostly directed towards high-tech companies. Differently from Europe, firms that are 
severely affected by low-cost import shocks are quick to change sector in the United States. 
Autor et al. (2017) report long-term negative consequences for American firms exposed to Chinese imports. 
During the years 1975-2013, both output (patenting) and input (R&D expenditure) margins decrease in response 
to imports. The response is confined to private-sector patenting activity but not to universities or government. 
Akcigit, Ates, and Impullitti (2018) explain the contrasting results concerning Europe and North America in 
the previous literature by staging a model consisting of three highly innovative countries and one lowly innovative 
country where the removal of import tariffs triggers a rush for innovation. In this scenario, firms that cannot reach 
the minimum threshold of R&D expenditure required for innovation will be squeezed out of the market, while 
those firms that are already sufficiently innovative will further increase their innovation capability. As a general 
rule, the positive or negative effects of an import shock vary significantly from one country to another according 
to the technological advancement of domestic firms and their distribution across sectors. 
(Bombardini et al. (2017) found that a sudden increase in import competition spurred innovation activities in 
China as well, but mainly for those firms which were already in the high-tech range of the market. In the years 
2000-2007, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization stimulated an increase in the patenting probability 
of high-tech firms by 3.6 - 4% for every percentage point drop in import tariffs. Trade liberalization also allowed 
such firms to enjoy a significant increase in R&D expenditures and in market shares as positive consequences of 
what can be called “escape-competition effect”. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1. Hypothesis 
Within the perspective of trade liberalization, a trade shock consisting of changing import volumes from China to 
Europe will be positively correlated with an increase in the innovation capacity of European countries. The 
theoretical basis for this hypothesis lies in the framework set out by Bloom et al. (2010) in the Trapped Factors 
model: in a situation whereby workers in a high-wage country have some firm-specific human capital and capital 
has firm-specific adjustment costs, the factors of production cannot easily move across sectors, and are therefore 
restricted to the production of non-innovative goods; an import shock from a low wage country will generate a 
new and stronger competition for this kind of “old” products, which existing firms won’t be able to fight on an 
equal footing; this is the case with Chinese imports, which are posing serious challenges to several European 
industries thanks to their lower price. Because of their inability to migrate to other sectors, the factor of productions 
in Europe are left with only one choice to counter this threat to their very survival: existing firms will be somehow 
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compelled to innovate and upgrade their products in order to escape the asymmetrical competition arising from 
the consequences of trade liberalization. 
In this analysis we go beyond the effects of the trade shock itself, focusing instead on the consequences of 
Chinese imports’ long-term impact on the innovation activities in Europe. We refer to a broad concept of 
international trade policy, focusing primarily on the country-level analysis of trade volume changes, and enabling 
a heterogeneity across countries which allows for a more even capture of the resulting effect. 
Earlier literature has it that trade liberalization’s repercussions on welfare are ambivalent, especially in static 
terms, where a positive outcome is by definition balanced by an increase in inequality. On the other hand, dynamic 
effects give a more optimistic outlook, with trade liberalization encouraging innovation through technology 
spillovers and escape-competition effects (Akcigit et al., 2018). 
 
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1 Model Specification 
This analysis draws inspiration from the Trapped Factors model of innovation, where the positive correlation 
between a trade shock caused by imports from a low-wage country and innovation activities in high-wage countries 
is explained by the compelled innovative impetus as a way to escape the surging competition. 
The panel data regression analysis is instrumental in estimating the relationship that exists between patent 
applications (our proxy variable for innovation) and the explanatory variables of trade-related innovation in Europe. 
Our main explanatory variable is imports from China, the major player behind the escape-competition innovation 
effect as theorized by Bloom et al. (2011). We run a regression analysis in order to estimate the correlation between 
different pairs of quantitative variables, and we seek to analyze and describe the results obtained from such test as 
a conclusion to our study. The pattern in the data is represented by the following equation: 
     ln Patent = β0 + β1 ln Imports + β2 ln Labor + β3 R&D + β1 ln FDI + β1 ln FDI_sq + μ   (1) 
Beside imports from China, other independent variables that we incorporate in our model and that can interact 
with patent applications include: Labor, FDI inflow, and the ratio of R&D expenditure over GDP. It is important 
to contextualize the effect of R&D expenditure as a comparison with that of imports from China, being both related 
to innovation activities. With regard to FDI inflow, we also add its squared term in order to account for the curve 
it produces. After obtaining a first estimate of the general picture, we divide our dataset into three different sections, 
in order to observe the specific behavior of variables in each single period. Every section encompasses five years, 
the first one running from 2002 to 2006, the second one from 2007 to 2011, and the third one from 2012 to 2016. 
3.2.2 Data 
While earlier studies focus primarily on short period of time bracketing China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization, our analysis starts off directly from China’s accession and goes as far as encompassing a 15-year 
time period, from 2002 to 2016. In our framework, we don’t look at European Union member countries but, instead, 
at European countries in broader geographical terms: we deem this framework to be more suitable as we look at 
trade with China, considering the most recent developments in the sphere of investments and trade agreements 
concluded under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
The sample of 22 European countries has been collected according to each country’s volume of Chinese 
imports, since this work is following the “trapped factors” model set up by Bloom et al. (2011) which regards 
Chinese imports as the primary source of competition-driven innovation activities. European countries with the 
largest Chinese import volumes across the years 2002-2016 have been selected for this analysis, the largest being 
Germany and the smaller being Belarus. Russia has been excluded for its geographical uniqueness and for the 
nature of its trade with China, which – differently from most of European countries – is dominated by the exchange 
of natural resources conducted between the Chinese-Russian border in eastern Asia. Although being 
extraordinarily amalgamated into the Russian sphere of influence, Belarus has been included in the analysis given 
its geographical position and its exponentially growing involvement in terms of investment and commerce with 
China in recent years. 
Both primary and secondary sources are used in order to collect, access, and evaluate information. Theoretical 
information is mainly found in academic papers from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Centre for Economic Performance, Princeton 
University, University of Bologna, Collège de France, Journal of Economic Literature; statistical data is extracted 
from organization databases, such as OECD Structural Analysis Database, the World Bank, the European 
Statistical Office (Eurostat), UNESCO, and the World Intellectual Property Organization, which provide reliable 
and diverse historical data for GDP, trade flows, employment, and patent applications (direct and PCT national 
phase entries). 
The GDP data in constant 2010 US dollars is collected from the World Bank for all countries except for 
Denmark and Romania, whose data is incomplete in such database; the GDP data for Denmark and Romania has 
been incorporated from the OECD Structural Analysis Database. The employment data for Belarus was collected 
from the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. 
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Patent applications are used here as a proxy for innovation. Patent data is collected at application filing date 
instead of publication date, as conventional in the innovation literature, since it is temporally closer to the actual 
implementation of the innovation activity. Coelli et al. (2018) demonstrate that there is a strong link between patent 
application and R&D expenditure, or between patent application and other innovation measures. Furthermore, 
patent data can serve as a reliable proxy for innovation given its resistance to trade shocks in terms of quality. 
Because of the liberalization, a higher number of patent applications might as well have emerged as a response to 
the need for a tougher protection system; Coelli (2018) proved this hypothesis wrong by controlling the number 
of citations in each single patent and their economic value. Since both variables are not negatively affected by the 
market shock – and therefore patent quality does not decline – there is sound proof that “patent applications” is 
actually a reliable proxy for measuring innovation. 
In collecting the data for patent application, we decided to focus only on those applications filed by actual 
residents of each country. In fact, as in the graphs shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 for the two sample years 2006 
and 2015, the share of patent applications filed by non-residents varies greatly over time, especially in certain 
countries such as Ireland, Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, and others, thus biasing the validity of our dependent 
variable. From a theoretical standpoint, it is safe to assume that the trade-driven innovation capacity of a country 
must be primarily significant for those citizens which are actually residents of that country, and therefore more 
exposed to the consequences of increasing import volumes. 
Labor in this study is defined as the total number of employed persons (the total number of persons working 
in the various industries), aged 15 to 64; it is extracted from the Eurostat database for the years 2002 to 2016, 
except for Belarus, as mentioned above. FDI inflows represents the total value of inbound Foreign Direct 
Investments for each country, recorded annually by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; we 
include the squared term of this variable in order to control for the curve pattern produced in the FDI inflows 
interval. 
 
Figure 1. Patent applications by Residents and Non-residents (2006). Source: WIPO 
In addition, we faced a choice concerning the very nature of the “imports from China” dataset used for this 
analysis: whereas the total value of Chinese imports is considered a straightforward measure, we found ourselves 
contemplating the usage of a potential substitute, namely the ratio of imports over the total trade with China 
(imports from China plus export to China). The latter measurement embraces the observation of two different 
variables instead of only one (imports and exports instead of imports only), and the significance of its values is 
therefore connected with the fluctuation of both variables: a decrease in the percentage share of imports over total 
trade could be symptomatic of a decrease of the import value itself, but also of an increase in the total value of 
exports included in the denominator. Hence, we came to the conclusion that the total value of imports would be 
more suitable to our model, as a “purer” representation of the changes in import volumes. 
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Figure 2. Patent applications by Residents and Non-residents (2015). Source: WIPO 
 
4. Analysis of Results 
Although our analysis is primarily aimed at estimating the role of Chinese imports in the scope of European 
innovation, there are several conclusions for us to infer. To begin with, we cannot only evaluate the mere effect of 
Chinese imports, but we also have to assess its uniformity across time periods of different lengths, as well as 
compare its impact with that of other innovation-related variables, such as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total 
GDP. The correlation with FDI inflow is also an interesting feature to observe, given its stability in our model 
paired up with a peculiar non-linearity. In the following sections we will analyze these effects separately, 
specifying the nature and magnitude of their impact. For each variable it has been employed the logged value, 
except for R&D expenditure to total GDP, which is in the form of ratio. The main results are presented in Column 
(1) of Table 1. 
 
4.1 General results  
Across the fifteen years of our sample, the impact from each one of our different variables changes in time 
according to its own specific features. Overall, it is recorded that imports from China have a positive correlation 
with patent application (in detail, a 10-percentage point increase in imports from China accounts for an average 
increase in innovation of 2.7% throughout the years 2002 to 2016). By looking at the p-value of Imports in Column 
(1) of Table 1, one could argue that the final results concerning our main variable are actually not significant. We 
can find a reasonable explanation for this by observing the single results obtained by the three different time 
periods in next section: in the regression analysis, the p-value of Imports changes dramatically at the moment we 
input the variable R&D expenditure, which is clearly the cause for this dysfunction (a comparison between 
statistical results before and after inputting R&D expenditure is shown in Appendix C); arguably, the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total GDP displays a very positive correlation with patent applications, as already pointed out by 
Coelli (2018), and it is safe to assume that its cumbersome presence is somehow hindering the significance of our 
main variable (imports), whose underlying effect is, in any case, positively assessed. 
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Table 1. The Impact of Chinese Imports on Patent Applications in European Countries 
Dependent variable is change in ln_Patents 
 Panel Data Analysis of Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 2002-2016 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
ln_Imports .27278 -.11686*** .14419* .26592** 
 (.02986) (.03197) (.07402) (.10554) 
ln_Labor .81426*** 1.19425*** .91287*** 1.01625*** 
 (.15287) (.18946) (.17320) (.16721) 
R&DtoGDP 19.01934*** .62167 17.90862** 23.21985*** 
 (5.81889) (4.21997) (8.19237) (7.18196) 
ln_FDI .06999*** .09771 -.02113 .07268** 
 (.02593) (.11027) (.04464) (.02925) 
ln_FDI_sq -.00340*** -.00219 .00101 -.00457*** 
 (.00119) (.00361) (.00179) (.00154) 
_cons -.43589 -3.01233 -1.89960 -4.40104 
P> chi2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Wald chi2 65.26 45.09 57.20 113.61 
Number of observations 324 103 109 109 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 
Note: standard error in parentheses. *** p > 0.01; ** p > 0.05; * p > 0.1 
The positive correlation between patent applications and imports is shown in the two graphs in Figure 3, the 
first image being a scatter plot generated by the two logged variables interacting with each other, and the second 
one showing the same results in the form of a linear prediction plot, featuring a darker coloration for the 95% 
confidence intervals. The same methodology is used to portray another important relationship, the one between 
patent applications and FDI inflows into each single country. The scatter plot graph and the linear prediction plot 
graph are reported in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3. Patent applications and import correlation (scatter and linear). 
 
 
Figure 4. Patent applications and import correlation (scatter and linear). 
As expounded in the next paragraph, the overall result for the impact of Chinese imports is somehow little, 
especially when compared with that displayed by the analysis of the single time periods 2007-2011 and 2012-2016. 
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Given the negative outcome emerging from the first section (years 2002 to 2006), this result is somehow 
understandable, as it balances the different magnitudes corresponding to each different growing stage. The positive 
correlation between imports and patent applications is easier to understand by looking at its evolution across the 
years. 
 
4.2 Results by time period 
In order to better observe and account for the swinging trend of our main variable, we divide our dataset into three 
separate sections, each of them encompassing five years. After that, we run the model again for each single time 
frame; the results are presented in Table 1, respectively: in Column (2) for the years 2002 to 2006; in Column (3) 
for the years 2007 to 2011; and in Column (4) for 2012 to 2016. 
With respect to the years 2002 to 2006, we observe a negative correlation between patent applications and 
imports from China. During these first five years after China’s accession to the WTO, arguably, it had not passed 
enough time yet for import volume variations to manifest their effect on innovation activities. This first section is 
the most problematic, as even the effect of other variables – such as FDI inflows and the ratio of R&D expenditure 
to total GDP – is not clear. 
In the second time section (Column (3)), the results associated with our expectations start to take shape: in 
the years 2007 to 2011, a 10 percentage point increase in imports from China corresponds to a 1.4% increase in 
patent applications, and starts to assume a positive position along the lines of the general results for the whole 15-
year period. Likewise, R&D expenditure is also entering its later stage, with its positive impact on innovation far 
exceeding the one generated by imports. The convoluted p-value displayed by FDI inflows is again obfuscating 
the actual role this variable has in our model. 
The final time period is the most eloquent expression of this whole experiment: during the years 2012 to 2016, 
the coefficient of Chinese imports keeps on growing, almost getting to the point of the one accounting for the 
whole 15-year period. The ratio of R&D expenditure to total GDP displays a linear growth as well, and the weight 
of its effect is visibly the largest on the table; in fact, its cumbersome presence is somehow hindering the 
significance of our main variable (imports), whose underlying effect is, in any case, positively assessed. 
 
4.3 FDI inflows 
It is interesting to look at the role of FDI inflow, and at the way it is correlated with patent applications. Whereas 
the general outlook seems positive, when we analyze each single 5-year time frame, we observe that the behavior 
of FDI inflow is not linear. In the years 2002 to 2006 the coefficient is positive, while it is negative in the years 
2007 to 2011, but in both cases the effect is not clear; in the last period, from 2012 to 2016, FDI inflow has a clear 
and positive effect. We include the squared term in the panel data regression in order to detect the pattern in the 
scope of the FDI inflows interval. By using a simple equation, we estimate the behavior of FDI inflows and identify 
the turning point at which its effect on patent applications ceases to be positive and enters a regressive tendency. 
We identify this turning point in our data sample at ln_FDIinflow = 10.2625 approximately, which in real terms is 
translated in 5.352 billion US dollars in inward Foreign Direct Investment. Therefore, the correlation between FDI 
inflows and patent applications for the European countries in our sample across the years 2002 to 2016 takes the 
form of an “inverted-U curve”, with the value of 5.352 billion US dollars considered as a turning point at which 
FDI inflows stops increasing linearly with patent applications and enters into a negative correlation trend. 
 
4.4 Extensions – Exports to China 
It could be argued that, as well as imports from China, exports from China into European countries might also 
affect innovation, especially through the market size effect, as shown by Aghion (2018) in relation to France. We 
construct a model that’s similar to our main experiment, by substituting imports with an “Exports to China” 
variable compiled with data from OECD. The overall results show a positive correlation, with values that are 
somehow comparable to those found in our main import-driven model. The time period subdivisions in Table 2 
allow us to more accurately assess the behavior of exports as a stimulator of innovation activities. 
The 2002-2006 section in Column (2) is negative and not significant, consistent with the findings of Bloom 
(2011) who did not extend the study further than 2005. In the second and third section, however, we witness a 
positive correlation that grows exponentially along the same lines of what we have seen in the case of imports. On 
a side note, when compared to the effect of imports from China on patent applications, the impact of exports is 
still weaker and it is slightly less significant. 
We then go as far as saying that exports to China were initially unlikely to significantly spur innovation, 
consistently with Bloom (2011), but that their role has changed in most recent years: with China’s technological 
capacity growing steadily and outmatching that of several European countries, as well as wealthier Chinese middle 
class booming in urbanized areas, the export-related innovation effects take on a new significance for European 
businesses; as positive as it may get, the impact of exports is still not as weighty as that of other variables we 
observed, such as imports from China and R&D expenditure. 
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Table 2. The Impact of Exports to China on Patent Applications in European Countries 
Dependent variable: ln_Patents 
 Panel Data Analysis of Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 2002-2016 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
ln_Exports .03519 -.00459 .19055*** .12907* 
 (.02493) (.03894) (.04340) (.07417) 
ln_Labor .98221*** 1.07158*** .98523*** 1.16989*** 
 (.11516) (.16305) (.12217) (.13638) 
R&DtoGDP 18.97034*** -1.82861 13.89028* 27.63150*** 
 (5.92649) (4.86950) (8.09939) (7.41218) 
ln_FDI .07194*** .02458 -.00620 .07070** 
 (.02680) (.02191) (.04455) (.03061) 
ln_FDI_sq -.00342*** -.00111 .00064 -.00454*** 
 (.00123) (.00106) (.00178) (.00160) 
_cons -1.95162 -3.01233 -2.77556 -4.38684 
P> chi2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Wald chi2 116.33 48.68 117.34 131.63 
Number of observations 324 106 109 109 
Number of groups 22 22 22 22 
Note: standard error in parentheses. *** p > 0.01; ** p > 0.05; * p > 0.1 
 
5. Conclusions 
We sought to observe the extent to which volume changes in imports from China affect innovation activities in 
Europe, which are delineated here as total applications of new patents by the residents of each single country. The 
effect is positive but weaker than the one recorded by Bloom (2011). First of all, Bloom (2011) focuses on the ten 
years embracing China’s accession to the WTO, and by including a time period prior to such accession, it accounts 
for the sharp break between the two time periods. Our study does not include this earlier period, and therefore the 
import volume variations are less dramatic and follow a more regular pattern. In any case, we account for a positive 
correlation between patent applications and imports from China which exponentially grows in time; the low 
coefficient representing the whole 15-year period is due to the act of balancing the fluctuating behavior of such 
relationship: the first section of our sample (2002-2006) displays a slightly negative correlation, since the time 
passed since China’s accession to the WTO was not yet enough for import volume variations to exert their effect 
on innovation activities; in the following years, the relationship between the two variables grew strongly on the 
positive side. Also, the magnitude of the said correlation might be weakened by the fact that China’s economic 
rise goes hand in hand with a staggering increase in average wage, which is now overcoming that of several 
European countries; given the fact that China cannot be considered a low wage country anymore, the innovation-
spurring effect of its exports is no longer covered by the theoretical assumptions of the trapped factors model, 
where increasing import volumes from a low-wage countries are stimulating innovation through an escape-
competition effect. Same goes for certain European countries that, after entering a downward spiral several years 
ago, never really recovered and are now suffering both socially and economically. 
One more contribution to the larger body of knowledge is related to the role of FDI inflows in relation to 
patent applications: according to our results, FDI inflows in European countries across the years 2002 to 2016 
have a positive correlation with patenting, but only up a certain point; in fact, when FDI inflows exceed a certain 
turning point (identified in our sample with the value of 5.352 billion US dollars), their effect on patent applications 
stops being positive and enters a negative tendency, in a pattern that can be visualized as an “inverted-U curve”. 
R&D expenditure over total GDP is the single most influential variable in this study, with its positive effect 
on patenting outshining that of every other variable; its bulky presence is shown to be somehow hampering the 
significance of our main value of interest, namely imports from China. We also observe the weight of European 
exports to China, and report that their impact on patent applications in European countries is also positive, but not 
as strong and significant as other variables that we evaluated, such as imports from China and, in particular, R&D 
expenditure. 
 
5.1 Policy implications 
In light of what has been said in the previous paragraph, it is reasonable for business entities and policymakers to 
understand and quantify the actual impact of trading with China. Imports from China and innovation activities in 
Europe are correlated; in this moment in time when China’s rise on the world stage has reached unprecedented 
levels, it becomes fundamental for all parties involved to be able to recognize the ramifications of such 
extraordinary event. 
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Empirical evidence, consistent with previous studies on the subject, suggests that there is a positive 
correlation between imports from China and the total number of patent applications in European countries. The 
recorded growth is expected to be exponential, as our commercial world is witnessing the occurrence of a peculiar 
state of affairs: China is set to abandon the status of low-wage country, while several European countries are 
entering a downward economic trend; at the same time, China couples this technology improvements with an 
undiminished export capacity, which is still huge and able to provide Europe with a massive quantity of products 
at a relatively competitive price. In strictly economic terms, trade with China is at the present a unique chance of 
growth and internationalization, although still hampered by political frictions ad non-matching standards. Finding 
a good compromise in this constantly evolving scenario could be instrumental in securing a priority position in the 
globalized trade network that is being created through heavy investment projects and market expansion. 
 
5.2 Prospects for future research 
The results we presented can shed new light on the correlation between commercial ties with low-wage countries 
and innovation activities in high-wage countries, in particular with regard to certain trade liberalization issues that 
have recently become a primary concern for public and private entities alike. 
As we look at the theoretical and empirical results, we must keep in mind that a research in this field by its 
own nature imposes certain limitations on the study and analysis. For instance, innovation is by definition not 
clearly defined, and therefore difficult to quantify and describe. Moreover, given the speed rate at which China 
and other developing countries are growing, it is difficult to frame their long-term trade-related impact in one 
model only, as their internal market is changing yearly. Whereas China can be considered a low-wage country in 
the 2000s, this definition cannot properly suit the country’s economic situation in 2015. 
Along these lines, there are indeed several unresolved issues which can be taken into consideration for future 
research, in order to extend the body of knowledge and lay out a more comprehensive framework concerning this 
interesting and very pressing contemporary topic. 
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Appendix A 
Patent applications breakdown for the year 2009* 
Year Residents Non-residents Total 
Austria 2263 292 2555 
Belarus 1753 173 1926 
Belgium 669 148 817 
Czech R. 789 92 881 
Denmark 1518 131 1649 
Finland 1806 127 1933 
France 14100 1593 15693 
Germany 47859 11724 59583 
Greece 698 22 720 
Hungary 757 30 787 
Ireland 908 53 961 
Italy 8814 903 9717 
Netherlands 2575 279 2854 
Norway 1246 2358 3604 
Poland 2899 241 3140 
Portugal 571 46 617 
Romania 1054 37 1091 
Slovak R. 176 63 239 
Spain 3596 207 3803 
Sweden 2186 463 2649 
Switzerland 1684 394 2078 
UK 15985 6480 22465 
Source: compiled by Author with information from OECD 
*We picked the year 2009 as an example for this display as it is the median year in our 15-year sample. 
Appendix B1 
Statistical Bulletin of Imports from China, Total Trade in Goods (US Dollars, Thousands) 2002-06 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Austria 1317085,69 1994972,00 2710712,14 3663346,36 4666446,31 
Belarus 46473,00 71775,00 158016,00 284103,00 548615,00 
Belgium 4483285,00 6209906,00 8310300,00 10811542,00 12644910,00 
Czech R. 2151254,00 2681355,00 3511680,00 3924158,00 5711365,00 
Denmark 1401269,00 2068991,00 2681942,00 3609716,00 4451729,00 
Finland 1165464,00 1774841,00 2445418,00 3491941,00 5146041,00 
France 10693297,00 15035689,00 20520022,00 25957090,00 30100036,00 
Germany 20003681,00 28197341,00 40198888,00 50308894,00 62805681,00 
Greece 1006466,00 1383112,00 1764602,00 2121195,00 2283667,00 
Hungary 2084878,00 3298099,00 2874298,00 3587953,00 3858845,00 
Ireland 1408080,00 2509257,00 3532718,00 4618218,00 5581796,00 
Italy 7832903,00 10787436,00 14699244,00 17574868,00 22465431,00 
Netherlands 8075798,00 11769061,00 17827987,00 23315724,00 28713521,00 
Norway 1852017,00 1744103,00 2406521,00 3112307,00 3662628,00 
Poland 2050109,00 2861560,00 4064568,00 5496607,00 7711682,00 
Portugal 324891,00 419777,00 569987,00 703301,00 966149,00 
Romania 372502,00 662065,00 1063524,00 1633013,00 2186618,00 
Slovak Republic 346529,00 558786,00 797079,00 1114141,00 1670198,00 
Spain 5463059,00 7623031,00 10613252,00 14557161,00 18050438,00 
Sweden 1125900,00 1796437,00 2396615,00 3012099,00 3938725,00 
Switzerland 1423756,00 1801300,00 2287952,00 2714221,00 3138035,00 
UK 16212725,00 20189144,00 26342081,00 31785924,00 36976088,00 
Source: compiled by Author with information from OECD. 
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Appendix B2 
Statistical Bulletin of Imports from China, Total Trade in Goods (US Dollars, Thousands) 2007-11 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 5423080,39 7185964,77 6184085,97 7101380,75 8899480,09 
Belarus 815791,00 1414812,00 1080126,00 1684084,00 2166471,00 
Belgium 17011503,00 19481063,00 14477661,00 16085272,00 20151706,00 
Czech R. 9193963,00 12386268,00 10470914,00 15332151,00 18905321,00 
Denmark 5493660,00 6485964,00 5369014,00 6367614,00 6705671,00 
Finland 6080915,00 6412777,00 4820847,00 5014485,00 3035973,00 
France 38714224,00 45493989,00 41252583,00 48872681,00 56189433,00 
Germany 74787152,00 86360220,00 77242640,00 101377133,00 112184062,00 
Greece 3830294,00 4865081,00 4242968,00 3797415,00 3467939,00 
Hungary 5128121,00 6129649,00 4949087,00 6173898,00 6076206,00 
Ireland 6556427,00 5756412,00 3591183,00 3344747,00 3574478,00 
Italy 29715296,00 34789589,00 26912057,00 38134114,00 41131342,00 
Netherlands 35978534,00 36641208,00 30412100,00 40899877,00 42497105,00 
Norway 4850662,00 5762374,00 5349101,00 6555804,00 8245490,00 
Poland 11753417,00 16797908,00 13780180,00 16514374,00 18116250,00 
Portugal 1437468,00 1956519,00 1543800,00 2079759,00 2077753,00 
Romania 2284511,00 3505096,00 2646080,00 3381517,00 3524775,00 
Slovak Republic 3091981,00 4173214,00 3122115,00 4003766,00 4643541,00 
Spain 25382674,00 30279433,00 20166444,00 25071366,00 25932836,00 
Sweden 5296175,00 5685492,00 4568077,00 7407657,00 6845033,00 
Switzerland 3986579,00 4641568,00 4714293,00 5848179,00 7119261,00 
UK 46624661,00 50330871,00 43434342,00 52398421,00 56807417,00 
Source: compiled by Author with information from OECD. 
 
Appendix B3 
Statistical Bulletin of Imports from China, Total Trade in Goods (US Dollars, Thousands) 2012-16 
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 8577141,56 8927902,40 9625626,15 8756280,01 5813408,18 
Belarus 2345021,00 2827152,00 947958,00 2321406,00 2117296,00 
Belgium 17348824,00 18514317,00 18108907,00 16212822,00 16173278,00 
Czech R. 15672786,00 15486206,00 17426277,00 18998267,00 17770970,00 
Denmark 6405170,00 6573975,00 7113521,00 6375316,00 6441266,00 
Finland 5882450,00 4857719,00 4950628,00 4368658,00 4456431,00 
France 53458273,00 54221963,00 56416480,00 51871364,00 51032598,00 
Germany 102389745,00 100313473,00 107593170,00 103348242,00 105289753,00 
Greece 2944647,00 2914167,00 3313758,00 2831346,00 3194687,00 
Hungary 5408549,00 5312914,00 5103185,00 4776877,00 4868856,00 
Ireland 3547683,00 3998043,00 4500699,00 4766005,00 4579105,00 
Italy 32162562,00 30634044,00 33305149,00 31315511,00 30194171,00 
Netherlands 41012544,00 42060625,00 47026706,00 38433062,00 35846316,00 
Norway 8077563,00 8260525,00 8484222,00 8126388,00 8011716,00 
Poland 17258096,00 19300516,00 22992572,00 22380369,00 23447667,00 
Portugal 1789521,00 1819906,00 2123608,00 1970979,00 2012714,00 
Romania 2687505,00 2620886,00 3149705,00 3205017,00 3818301,00 
Slovak Republic 4855332,00 6072253,00 6676017,00 6432928,00 6348683,00 
Spain 22671308,00 23059557,00 26227845,00 26474440,00 26404752,00 
Sweden 6621088,00 6720462,00 7292223,00 6986536,00 6511679,00 
Switzerland 11072618,00 12334782,00 13284726,00 12957716,00 12576584,00 
United Kingdom 56267400,00 57587865,00 64147254,00 62979614,00 59575883,00 
Source: compiled by Author with information from OECD. 
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Appendix C 
Comparison between panel data regression analysis with and without R&D expenditure over GDP 
Dependent variable is change in ln_Patents 
 Panel Data Analysis of Random Effects 
Variables 2002-2016 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
ln_Imports .27278 -.11686*** .14419* .26592** 
 (.02986) (.03197) (.07402) (.10554) 
ln_Labor .81426*** 1.19425*** .91287*** 1.01625*** 
 (.15287) (.18946) (.17320) (.16721) 
R&DtoGDP 19.01934*** .62167 17.90862** 23.21985*** 
 (5.81889) (4.21997) (8.19237) (7.18196) 
ln_FDI .06999*** .09771 -.02113 .07268** 
 (.02593) (.11027) (.04464) (.02925) 
ln_FDI_sq -.00340*** -.00219 .00101 -.00457*** 
 (.00119) (.00361) (.00179) (.00154) 
_cons 
 
-.43589 -3.01233 -1.89960 -4.40104 
Note: standard error in parentheses. *** p > 0.01; ** p > 0.05; * p > 0.1 
 
Dependent variable is change in ln_Patents 
 Panel Data Analysis of Random Effects 
Variables 2002-2016 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
ln_Imports .07208*** -.11729*** .15607** .29936*** 
 (.02672) (.02996) (.07437) (.10981) 
ln_Labor .73732*** 1.18009*** .87142*** .97821*** 
 (.16159) (.20121) (.18675) (.17708) 
ln_FDI .07425*** .10149 -.02672 .06427** 
 (.02605) (.10430) (.04457) (.02973) 
ln_FDI_sq -.00376*** -.00232 .00101 -.00393** 
 (.00118) (.00341) (.00179) (.00154) 
_cons .0998388 -2.90473 -1.33206 -4.02549 
     
Note: standard error in parentheses. *** p > 0.01; ** p > 0.05; * p > 0.1 
  
